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1353 
COMPLETING THE PICTURE OF UNCERTAIN 
PATENT SCOPE 
GREG REILLY

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Uncertain patent scope is perhaps the most significant problem facing 
the patent system.
1
 Uncertainty in patent rights leads to avoidable 
infringement; suppressed competition; inefficient innovation, investment, 
and licensing decisions; increased business costs; and unnecessary 
litigation.
2
 This uncertainty has long been blamed on the Federal Circuit’s 
rules for interpreting claims, the short summaries at the end of the patent 
that define the patentee’s exclusive rights.3 
Near the end of this Term, the Supreme Court tackled uncertain patent 
scope in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
4
 but not by addressing 
interpretation of patent claims (known as claim construction). Instead, the 
Supreme Court addressed the standard for determining whether patent 
claims are invalid as indefinite for failing to “particularly point[] out and 
distinctly claim[]” the invention.5 Suddenly, large segments of the patent 
community blamed uncertain patent scope on the Federal Circuit’s lax 
indefiniteness standard, which only invalidated a claim “when it is not 
amenable to construction or insolubly ambiguous.”6 Tightening the 
indefiniteness standard—whether by rendering a claim indefinite when it 
“is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation,” as Nautilus 
and some amici proposed,
7
 or only when it is not “reasonably clear” to 
 
 
  Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School.  
 1. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 10 (2008). 
 2. See FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE & 
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 76–80 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
 3. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of 
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1033–36 (2007). 
 4. 542 U.S. __; No. 13-369, slip op. (June 2, 2014). 
 5. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). 
 6. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quotations 
omitted), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014).  
 7. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL 768314, at *2 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2014) 
[hereinafter Nautilus Br.]; see also Brief of Amazon.com, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 16, Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL 828060, at *16 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter 
Amazon Br.]; Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Peter S. Menell in Support of Neither Party at 38–39, 
Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL 880962, at *38–39 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Menell Br.]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1354 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:1353 
 
 
 
 
people working in the field, as other amici proposed
8—was said to be a 
panacea that would provide “competitors and the public with clear 
guidance on what is and is not prohibited.”9 
The well-established problems with the Federal Circuit’s claim 
construction rules were almost entirely ignored in the materials submitted 
to the Supreme Court. Rather, the Court was incorrectly told that claim 
construction has “no bearing on whether the boundaries of the claim itself 
are definite to a skilled artisan”;10 that indefiniteness is resolvable without 
the need for claim construction;
11
 and even that claim construction is “a 
task that courts are well-equipped to undertake using existing law.”12 As a 
result, the Supreme Court resolved Nautilus with only a partial view of 
uncertain patent scope, a view that did not include what was widely seen 
as the source of the problem until the Court granted certiorari in Nautilus.  
In doing so, the Supreme Court held “that a patent is invalid for 
indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the 
patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable 
certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention,” without 
providing any further guidance as to what constituted “reasonable 
certainty.”13 Early commentary has been critical of this lack of guidance, 
with one commentator concluding, “we know very little more about the 
subject now that we’ve seen the opinion than we did before.”14 
This Commentary completes the picture by addressing the intertwined 
relationship of claim construction, indefiniteness, and uncertain patent 
scope. Claim construction is a necessary threshold step and, if effective, 
can resolve uncertainties in claim scope, reducing the need to invalidate 
claims as indefinite, as discussed in Part II. Part III demonstrates how the 
Federal Circuit’s failed claim construction rules accentuate, rather than 
 
 
 8. Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Property Owners Ass’n in Support of Neither Party 
at 4, Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL 891766, at *4 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter IPO Br.]; see also, 
e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae AARP in Support of Petitioner at 7, Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL 
880961, at *7 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter AARP Br.]; Brief of Yahoo! Inc. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Reversal at 5, Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL 880959, at *5 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) 
[hereinafter Yahoo! Br.]. 
 9. Brief of Nova Chems. Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21, Nautilus, No. 
13-369, 2014 WL 880957, at *21 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014). 
 10. Nautilus Br., supra note 7, at 46. 
 11. Amazon Br., supra note 7, at 18–19. 
 12. Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 5, Nautilus, No. 
13-369, 2014 WL 880963, at *5 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter ABA Br.].  
 13. Nautilus, No. 13-369, slip op. at 1. 
 14.  Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices take blue pencil to Federal Circuit opinions on 
definiteness, SCOTUSBLOG (June 3, 2014, 10:49 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinion-
analysis-justices-take-blue-pencil-to-federal-circuit-opinions-on-definiteness/.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/10
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resolve, ambiguities in claim scope. Part IV explains how the 
ineffectiveness of claim construction increases the need for an effective 
indefiniteness doctrine, but, perversely, both decreased the effectiveness of 
the Federal Circuit’s pre-Nautilus standard and renders any stricter 
standard too draconian. Part IV proposes that the best way to address 
uncertain claim scope is to make claim construction more effective, while, 
surprisingly, largely retaining the Federal Circuit’s pre-Nautilus 
indefiniteness standard. 
II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND INDEFINITENESS 
A. Claim Construction as Threshold Step 
Since “[n]either written words nor the sounds that the written words 
represent have any inherent meaning,” words only acquire meaning from 
context.
15
 In patent law, claim construction is the process of determining 
meaning from the relevant context,
16
 including the rest of the claim 
language, the written description of the invention in the patent 
specification, the Patent Office record, and technical texts or expert 
testimony about the background understanding in the field.
17
  
Context is necessary to determine meaning, even for technically-savvy 
people reading technical terms.
18
 As a result, claim construction does not 
just occur ex post in litigation to help lay juries, as suggested in the 
Nautilus briefing.
19
 “Claim construction is conducted by all players in the 
patent system,” including the Patent Office, competitors, investors, and 
researchers.
20
 Even in litigation, claims are construed to have “the 
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in 
question at the time of the invention,”21 which is not necessarily 
understandable to lay people.
22
 
 
 
 15. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS, at xxvii, 33, 167 (2012). 
 16. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[2] (2006). 
 17. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 18. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1752–53 (2009). 
 19. See Nautilus Br., supra note 7, at 46 (“Many claim-construction disputes do not involve real 
disagreement over a claim’s scope, but only over the manner in which the words of the claim should 
be described in laypersons’ terms for the jury.”). 
 20. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of 
the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
COMMON LAW 123, 125 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013). 
 21. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13.  
 22. See, e.g., Butamax™ Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc., 746 F.3d 1302, 1313–14 (Fed. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Thus, claim terms cannot be unambiguous on their face without resort 
to context through claim construction, as proposed by some in Nautilus.
23
 
To the contrary, the Supreme Court and other courts have consistently 
evaluated indefiniteness only after looking to context for meaning, i.e., 
after claim construction.
24
 Despite the suggestions in the Nautilus 
briefing,
25
 this does not mean that litigation is necessary to ascertain claim 
scope. In theory, observers ex ante should be able to “understand what is 
the scope of the patent owner’s rights by obtaining the patent and 
prosecution history . . . and applying established rules of construction” and 
“be able to rest assured . . . that a judge . . . will similarly analyze the text 
of the patent and its associated public record and apply the established 
rules of construction” to reach the same construction.26 
B. Claim Construction’s Impact on Patent Uncertainty 
Claim construction is crucial to the certainty of patent scope. As is true 
of all words,
27
 “claims which on first reading—in a vacuum, if you will—
appear indefinite may upon a reading of the specification disclosure or 
prior art teachings become quite definite.”28 For example, a claim may use 
an unusual word or words in an unusual way or combination, which, in the 
abstract, would make claim scope uncertain. No uncertainty exists, 
however, if the specification expressly defines the term
29
 or uses it in a 
way that makes its meaning clear.
30
  
 
 
Cir. 2014) (construing term to mean “an enzyme, whether naturally occurring or otherwise, known by 
the EC number 1.1.1.86 that catalyzes the conversion of acetolactate to 2,3-dihydroxyisovalerate”); 
Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., et al., No. 2012-1576, slip op. at 10; 2014 WL 463757, at *3 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding term “was correctly construed to include 3-isobutylGABA regardless of its 
enantiomeric forms . . . “). 
 23. See Amazon Br., supra note 7, at 18–19 (arguing that clarity of a patent’s scope should be 
required when the patent issues).  
 24. See, e.g., United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 233–36 (1942) (looking 
to specification and testimony of skilled person); Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 
F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Ga.-Pac. Corp. 
v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 25. See Amazon Br., supra note 7, at 18–19. 
 26. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978–79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (citation omitted).  
 27. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 32–33. 
 28. Merat, 519 F.2d at 1394 n. 2 (quotations omitted). 
 29. See Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705–06 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (term lacking well-understood meaning not indefinite because of express specification 
definition). 
 30. See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 493 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (specification “clearly communicates” that claim used “heading” to mean “bearing”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/10
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Claim construction’s impact on uncertain patent scope depends on how 
effective its rules are at leading different observers to reach the same 
conclusion on claim meaning, which in turn depends both on whether the 
rules for claim construction are well-established and indisputable and 
whether the substance of those rules is likely to generate a single meaning, 
rather than a range of possible meanings.
31
 The more effective the claim 
construction rules, the fewer uncertain patents will remain to which 
indefiniteness could apply. Conversely, the less effective the claim 
construction rules, more uncertain patents will remain for potential 
invalidation for indefiniteness.  
III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND UNCERTAIN CLAIM SCOPE 
A. Blaming Claim Construction for Uncertain Patent Scope 
Unsurprisingly, large segments of the patent community sought to 
tighten the indefiniteness standard in Nautilus. The Federal Circuit’s claim 
construction rules are a complete mess, increasing the need for 
indefiniteness to invalidate uncertain patents and protect public notice. 
Surprisingly, though, the “broken” claim construction rules that have 
“engross[ed]” commentators and Federal Circuit judges in the past32 
received only passing and vague reference in the Nautilus briefing.
33
 
Instead, the Supreme Court was told that the failure of patents to 
“reasonably inform those skilled in the art about the invention’s scope,”34 
which undermines their “public-notice function”35 of identifying “the 
metes and bounds of the claimed invention,” was caused by the Federal 
Circuit’s lax indefiniteness standard.36 The consequences of this weak 
indefiniteness doctrine were said to include: (1) a range of possible claim 
scopes, rather than a single discernible scope;
37
 (2) “changing, even 
 
 
 31. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope 
Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 99–100 (2005). 
 32. Lefstin, supra note 3, at 1033–1035. 
 33. See Brief of Microsoft Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 24–25, Biosig 
Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 542 U.S. __; No. 13-369, slip op. (June 2, 2014), 2014 WL 880964, 
at *24–25 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Microsoft Br.] (mentioning panel-dependence and high 
reversal rates of claim construction); see also AARP Br., supra note 8, at 6 (noting that claim 
construction is confusing and difficult); Menell Br., supra note 7, at 9–10 (briefly identifying four 
problems previously attributed to claim construction); Yahoo! Br., supra note 8, at 15 (noting in 
passing that some uncertainties “are best redressed by proper claim construction”). 
 34. See Yahoo! Br., supra note 8, at 3. 
 35. Id. at 10.  
 36. Id. at 5.  
 37. Nautilus Br., supra note 7, at 33.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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inconsistent positions” by the patentee;38 (3) claim scope that is only 
knowable after litigation and appeal to the Federal Circuit;
39
 
(4) exploitation of ambiguous claims to expand patent scope beyond the 
patentee’s actual invention;40 (5) incentives to draft ambiguous patent 
claims;
41
 (6) chilling of follow-on innovation and competition;
42
 
(7) increased cost and risk for competitors;
43
 (8) increased disputes and 
litigation over claim scope;
44
 and (9) greater difficulty for courts in 
discerning claim scope.
45
 
Yet, before Nautilus, the indefiniteness doctrine was largely an 
afterthought in the debate over uncertain patent scope,
46
 and the Federal 
Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence was blamed for the failure of 
public notice: “uncertainty over the proper procedure for claim 
construction has led to uncertainty in patent scope, which in turn negates 
the notice and boundary-staking functions to be performed by the patent 
claim.”47 Indeed, each of the consequences of poor notice now attributed 
to indefiniteness has been blamed in the past on claim construction.
48
 
Thus, the myopic focus on the indefiniteness doctrine in Nautilus left the 
Supreme Court with imperfect information on the source of uncertainty in 
claim scope, contributing to a sub-optimal resolution. 
B. Claim Construction’s Contribution to Uncertain Claim Scope 
For good reason, uncertain claim scope has long been associated with 
failed claim construction rules. The Federal Circuit’s claim construction 
jurisprudence creates uncertainty in at least two, and perhaps three, ways. 
First, the rules for claim construction are unpredictable. A persistent 
methodological split exists in the Federal Circuit as to whether claim 
 
 
 38. Id. at 47.  
 39. Id. at 30–31.  
 40. Id. at 38–39.  
 41. Id. at 30–32.  
 42. Id. at 29–30  
 43. Id. at 28–29.  
 44. Microsoft Br., supra note 33, at 31–33. 
 45. See Nautilus Br., supra note 7, at 33–34. 
 46. A search of SSRN on April 11, 2014 for the terms “indefiniteness” and “patent” yielded four 
results, but a search for “claim construction” and “patent” yielded 101. 
 47. Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 64 (2006). 
 48. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 57–58 (patentee inconsistency); Burk & Lemley, 
supra note 18, at 1762 (incentives to draft and exploit ambiguous claims); William R. Hubbard, 
Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327, 338 (2009) (chills innovation and competition; 
increases business costs, claim construction disputes, litigation, and costs of determining scope); 
Lefstin, supra note 3, at 1062–63 (range of meanings; uncertainty until appellate construction). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/10
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construction focuses on a term’s general meaning in the field of the 
invention (as evidenced through expert testimony or technical 
publications), with only limited resort to the description in the patent itself, 
or on the term’s use in the patent itself, with only limited resort to extrinsic 
evidence for background.
49
 These divergent methodologies generally lead 
to different claim scope and “appear[] to be the genesis of almost all 
disputes” over the meaning of patent claims.50 This methodological split is 
one of, if not the, major causes of uncertainty in patent scope.
51
 Pre-
litigation, each party can adopt the approach that best suits its interests, 
undermining licensing efforts and encouraging litigation. Neither party can 
reliably predict the actual claim scope, which depends on the district 
judge’s choice of methodological approach and (absent settlement) 
whether this choice is the same as that of two of the three judges on the 
Federal Circuit panel.
52
 
Second, uncertainty exists because some Federal Circuit cases continue 
to emphasize the general meaning in the field, as evidenced by extrinsic 
texts or expert testimony. Due to the difficulty of identifying the precise 
field and skill level of the invention and finding a source in the precise 
field and at the precise skill level and time, there is likely to be a variety of 
equally plausible sources, often with varying meanings, undermining 
efforts to accurately predict claim scope ex ante and encouraging 
gamesmanship in litigation.
53
 Although a few commentators continue to 
believe that the general meaning approach best promotes predictability,
54
 
there is growing recognition that focusing on how a claim term is used in 
the publicly-available patent and Patent Office record puts all consumers 
of claim construction on the same footing and increases the chances that 
different observers will reach the same construction, enhancing certainty 
in claim scope.
55
 
Third, for years, large segments of the patent community contended 
that the Federal Circuit’s de novo review of district court claim 
 
 
 49. See Cotropia, supra note 31, at 82–93. 
 50. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical 
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1144 (2004); see also id. at 57, 105–
115 . 
 51. See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2012-1014, slip 
op. at 27 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (en banc) (quoting amicus brief of Google, Amazon, Hewlett-
Packard, Red Hat and Yahoo!); Osenga, supra note 47, at 71–73. 
 52. Osenga, supra note 47, at 71–72. 
 53. See Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary Reader 
Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 271–77 (2014). 
 54. See, e.g., Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 20, at 144. 
 55. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at 102. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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constructions was the primary cause of uncertainty.
56
 I previously 
questioned this view because de novo review only affects ex post certainty 
of the few patents litigated to a district court claim construction, not the far 
more important ex ante predictability of claim scope pre-litigation,
57
 a 
position that was recently endorsed by the en banc Federal Circuit.
58
 
Regardless, many respected observers have blamed uncertainty on de novo 
review of claim construction, but virtually no mention was made of it in 
the Nautilus briefing. 
IV. OPTIMIZING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND INDEFINITENESS 
A. Indefiniteness in the Time of Claim Construction Uncertainty 
The pervasive problems with the Federal Circuit’s claim construction 
rules have perverse effects. They increase the need for indefiniteness to 
police uncertainty in claim scope, while at the same time rendering the 
Federal Circuit’s pre-Nautilus indefiniteness standard less effective and 
the consequences of tightening the standard untenable. 
The ineffectiveness of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction 
jurisprudence reduces the number of patent claims whose scope is 
predictable ex ante through resort to contextual information, increasing the 
problem of uncertain patent scope. This imposes a greater need to 
invalidate patents as indefinite to protect public notice, a need that played 
out in Nautilus. 
At same time, the claim construction problems undermined the 
effectiveness of the Federal Circuit’s pre-Nautilus indefiniteness 
standard—whether a claim is not amenable to construction or insolubly 
ambiguous—at weeding out uncertain patent claims. Courts had two 
equally plausible methodologies with which to “solve” any ambiguity. If 
the patent-focused approach did not yield a clear answer, the court could 
turn to the general-meaning-focused approach, and vice-versa. Moreover, 
current doctrine allows a construction based on extrinsic evidence of the 
supposed general meaning in the field, even if not tied to the patent itself. 
Almost always, there will be some text or expert witness to support a 
 
 
 56. Lefstin, supra note 3, at 1034–35. 
 57. See Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the En Banc Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong 
Claim Construction Issue, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43 (2013), available at https://lawreview. 
uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Reilly_Online_Final.pdf. 
 58. See, e.g., Lighting Ballast, slip op. at 26–30. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to 
address the proper standard of review for claim construction, albeit not in the Lighting Ballast case. 
See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1621, 2014 WL 1516642 (2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/10
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supposed general meaning, no matter how obscure. Indefiniteness was 
therefore a rare outcome
59
 because virtually any claim will be amenable to 
construction and any ambiguity “solvable” ex post in litigation due to 
open-ended claim construction rules. Of course, the open-ended nature of 
claim construction rules also means that this “solution” often will not be 
predictable ex ante, resulting in rampant uncertainty of claim scope.  
In light of the increased need for indefiniteness and decreased 
effectiveness of the Federal Circuit’s doctrine, many in Nautilus logically 
sought to tighten the indefiniteness standard. Unfortunately, the claim 
construction problems also make it nearly impossible to tighten 
indefiniteness without gutting the patent system. Nautilus’s proposed 
“more than one reasonable interpretation” standard would leave virtually 
every patent susceptible to invalidation, as many amici argued even 
without raising claim construction problems.
60
 The two competing 
methodologies, each equally reasonable under existing law, often lead to 
different interpretations, while parties normally can identify more than one 
reasonable meaning from extrinsic texts or expert testimony.  
Even the more moderate proposal for a “reasonable certainty” standard, 
ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court, could imperil a substantial 
number of patents under the current state of claim construction. How 
many claims can be said to be “reasonably certain” ex ante when a court is 
equally justified in choosing between two different methodologies that 
lead to different substantive interpretations? Or when an observer cannot 
reliably predict ex ante what obscure technical text or self-interested 
expert testimony a court will rely upon in adversarial litigation? In fact, 
under current rules, an observer cannot even be confident that courts will 
honor the patent’s express definition of a term if it departs from the 
supposed “plain and ordinary meaning.”61  
Thus, in the face of pervasive uncertainty in claim construction, 
tightening the indefiniteness standard to resolve uncertain patent scope 
comes at the cost of imperiling large swaths of patents, patents that would 
be at risk largely because the Federal Circuit has failed at claim 
construction. Faced with these consequences, it is not surprising that the 
Federal Circuit considered a claim definite as long as it could “be given 
any reasonable meaning.”62 
 
 
 59. Amazon Br., supra note 7, at 14–15 (noting that “fewer than 6% of patent invalidations are 
based on indefiniteness”). 
 60. See, e.g., Yahoo! Br., supra note 8, at 5. 
 61. Butamax™, slip op. at 10–18. 
 62. Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F. 3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. Solving the Uncertainty of Patent Scope? 
The Supreme Court faced the unenviable choice in Nautilus of either 
affirming the Federal Circuit’s indefiniteness standard and endorsing 
rampant uncertainty in patent scope or tightening the standard and 
imperiling large numbers of patents. The result was an opinion that did not 
say particularly much. There has to be a better way to combat uncertain 
patent scope. 
An obvious first step is to correct the Federal Circuit’s claim 
construction failures. Simply adopting a single methodology would create 
“an inherent certainty.”63 Choosing the patent-focused methodology is 
even more promising “[f]rom a notice perspective,” as this “material is 
easily identifiable by, and accessible to, third parties” ex ante, whereas 
observers “cannot know in advance what external evidence will be 
utilized” under a general-meaning-focused approach.64 Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to review claim construction 
problems,
65
 leaving the Court in the position it faced in Nautilus. 
Under well-functioning claim construction rules, an indefiniteness 
standard is still needed to address uncertain scope not resolved by resort to 
context. The “more than one reasonable interpretation” standard would 
remain overbroad. Even with optimal claim construction rules, there will 
often be multiple reasonable, even if not likely, interpretations, sometimes 
because of the patentee’s strategic drafting but often because of the 
inherent shortcomings of language or the skills and incentives of litigators. 
When a competitor applying well-functioning claim construction rules can 
predict two possible constructions, with say one seventy-five percent 
likely and the other twenty-five percent likely, claim scope is sufficiently 
predictable and the possibility of a wrong prediction is part of ordinary 
business risk that can be factored into an activity’s cost-benefit analysis.66 
Invalidating the patent as indefinite in such circumstances is a draconian 
remedy in pursuit of unobtainable absolute certainty.  
 
 
added; quotations omitted). 
 63. Cotropia, supra note 31, at 99. 
 64. See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at 102. 
 65. See, e.g., Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC v. Medtronic Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014) 
(denying certiorari); Retractable Technologies Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 133 S. Ct. 833 (2013) 
(denying certiorari). 
 66. Cf. Brief of Biotechnology Indus. Org. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 27–28, 
Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 542 U.S. __; No. 13-369, slip op. (June 2, 2014), 2014 WL 
1348469, at *27–28 (Apr. 2, 2014). 
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By contrast, the more moderate “reasonable certainty” standard 
adopted by the Supreme Court is consistent with a pursuit of 
predictability, not absolute certainty. If claim scope is “reasonably clear,” 
competitors can reliably predict the likelihood of a particular scope and 
evaluate the risk of a wrong prediction. At the same time, it is odd to 
address an uncertainty problem with a vague standard like “reasonable 
certainty.” How likely must a particular interpretation be to be “reasonably 
certain”? Fifty-five percent? Eighty percent? The vagueness of 
“reasonable certainty” could undermine efforts to predict claim scope, as it 
would be difficult to know when a claim had valid scope and when it was 
invalid as indefinite.
67
 This could encourage disputes over indefiniteness, 
hindering licensing and settlement efforts and increasing litigation. 
Likewise, parties could be encouraged to more vigorously dispute claim 
construction, knowing that even a clear losing argument could be deemed 
sufficiently strong to invalidate the claim as not “reasonably certain.” 
Surprisingly, with improved claim construction rules, the most sensible 
indefiniteness standard would be a clarified version of the Federal 
Circuit’s pre-Nautilus standard. In most cases, the improved claim 
construction rules would make claim scope sufficiently predictable ex 
ante. Only in limited cases would resort to context fail to “solve” the 
ambiguity in claim scope, which could occur in two ways under the 
preferred patent-focused methodology. First, the patent may provide 
insufficient contextual information to solve the ambiguity by, for example, 
not using a claim term in the rest of the patent or doing so only vaguely or 
in passing. Second, a term could be used in different, inconsistent, or 
ambiguous ways in different parts of the patent, giving rise to two equally 
plausible interpretations. Invalidation for indefiniteness would be 
appropriate in these circumstances where the claim term “is not amenable 
to construction” because there is insufficient contextual information or is 
“insolubly ambiguous” because the contextual information leads to two 
equally plausible interpretations.
68
 This is essentially the Federal Circuit’s 
pre-Nautilus standard, except clarifying “insolubly ambiguous” to include 
two equally plausible interpretations, not just the absence of any plausible 
interpretation. 
Thus, the indefiniteness doctrine would play a crucial role in protecting 
public notice even with a better claim construction process by invalidating 
 
 
 67.  See Mann, supra note 14 (suggesting Supreme Court “reasonable certainty” standard “will 
turn out to have made the boundary between definite and indefinite even less clear than it was before 
the Court addressed the question”). 
 68. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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the limited patent claims that remain ambiguous or vague even after 
applying the improved claim construction rules. More importantly, it 
would incentivize patent drafters to provide sufficient, and sufficiently 
clear, contextual information in the first place, increasing claim 
construction’s effectiveness at providing public notice ex ante and 
decreasing the need to protect public notice only ex post through 
invalidation. Admittedly, as compared to a “reasonable certainty” 
standard, the Federal Circuit’s pre-Nautilus standard would not eliminate 
as many close calls on claim construction (e.g., where one construction is 
fifty-five percent likely and the other is forty-five percent likely) or 
provide as strong incentives for clear drafting, at least in theory. But 
“equally plausible” is a clearer rule than “reasonable certainty,” improving 
the predictability of the indefiniteness determination and better facilitating 
planning, licensing, and settlement. Any need for clearer drafting could be 
satisfied by new requirements for patent applications, such as glossaries of 
key terms.
69
  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court backed itself into a corner in Nautilus by choosing 
to address uncertain patent scope through indefiniteness, not claim 
construction. Likely seeking any result that will combat so-called “patent 
trolls,”70 the patent community exacerbated the problem by failing to 
inform the Court of the well-recognized problems with claim construction. 
Unfortunately, there was no clear path to a good result in Nautilus. The 
only sensible approach is to first fix the Federal Circuit’s failed claim 
construction jurisprudence.  
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/10
